High Court Judgments of Public Interest
This page provides access to judgments of the High Court in the last 90 days deemed to be of particular public interest.
More information about finding court judgments is available on the Judgments section of this website.
It is the responsibility of users of the information contained in these decisions to ensure compliance with conditions or other legal obligations governing access, release, storage and re-publication. See also the guide on statutory provisions that prohibit publication of certain information in certain circumstances (PDF, 211 KB). If in doubt you should consult the court that issued the decision(s). Judicial decisions are presented in PDF format to preserve the integrity of the documents.
Case name
Case number
[2025] NZHC 228
Date of Judgment
19 February 2025
Summary
Sentencing for drug driving causing death to one victim and serious injury to another and other driving and drug offences; several aggravating factors engaged; defendant was driving under the influence of methamphetamine, cannabis and diazepam; defendant was engaged in a prolonged, persistent and deliberate course of very bad driving; driving was aggressive and highly dangerous; defendant was driving while distracted, sending texts and engaging in a 21 minute video call; these texts recorded he had previously crashed twice that morning and effectively bragging; defendant had little sleep the night before; defendant did not hold a licence and the car was not registered; driving killed one victim, being the passenger of the other vehicle, severely injured the driver and killed their pet dog.
HELD: starting point of six years' imprisonment for lead offence of drug driving causing death; five per cent uplift for previous driving convictions including those in Australia; 15 per cent discount for guilty plea; 12.5 per cent discount for background factors and rehabilitative potential; no discount for remorse or parental incarceration; end sentence of four years and eight months' imprisonment; disqualified for five years; no reparation order.
HELD: starting point of six years' imprisonment for lead offence of drug driving causing death; five per cent uplift for previous driving convictions including those in Australia; 15 per cent discount for guilty plea; 12.5 per cent discount for background factors and rehabilitative potential; no discount for remorse or parental incarceration; end sentence of four years and eight months' imprisonment; disqualified for five years; no reparation order.
Case number
[2025] NZHC 190
Date of Judgment
17 February 2025
Summary
High Court releases judicial review decision in Aitken v Judicial Conduct Commissioner & Anor.
Media Release
- MR [2025] NZHC 190 (PDF, 121 KB)
Case name
Case number
[2025] NZHC 176
Date of Judgment
14 February 2025
Summary
Sentencing - the offender was charged with murder and found guilty by the jury on a charge of manslaughter - the offending occurred after the offender used a knife to fend off an attack by the victim - this resulted in the victim receiving a fatal stab wound to the neck - starting point of seven years imprisonment reduced to six years to reflect the provocative conduct of the victim- discount of 20 per cent to reflect an offer to plead guilty to the charge of manslaughter - global discount of 30 per cent to reflect other mitigating factors including youth (the offender was 16 years of age at the time of the offending), remorse, rehabilitative prospects and factors identified in reports produced at sentencing - end sentence of three years imprisonment.
Case name
Case number
[2025] NZHC 160
Date of Judgment
13 February 2025
Summary
Successful appeal against conviction for assault.
Case name
Case number
[2025] NZHC 50
Date of Judgment
04 February 2025
Summary
Application for judicial review relating to the Real Estate Agent Authority's decision in 2022 to mandate completion of a course, Te Kakano, as part of 2023 continuing education requirements for real estate licensees. Mrs Dickson claimed that the practice rules under which the Authority and the Associate Minister of Justice prescribed continuing education requirements are invalid under the Real Estate Agents Act 2008, that the Authority's decision to mandate Te Kakano was invalid, and that the decision of the Registrar of the registry of licensees to refuse to grant her an exemption from completing the course was invalid because he had applied a blanket "no- exemptions" policy. Application dismissed.
Media Release
- MR [2025] NZHC 50 (PDF, 192 KB)
Case name
Case number
[2025] NZHC 30
Date of Judgment
28 January 2025
Summary
Ms Taylor seeks an award of exemplary damages against the Royal New Zealand Airforce (RNZAF). Her claim arises out of the sexual abuse and false imprisonment she suffered at the hands of Mr Roper when they were both in the RNZAF in the 1980s. The claim is the last part of a proceeding which Ms Taylor began in 2016. The first High Court judgment was delivered in 2018. Following successive appeals, the Supreme Court confirmed that Ms Taylor's claim for compensation is barred by the Accident Compensation Act 2001.
Exemplary damages are in a different category to those routinely sought in a civil claim. Rather than compensating for harm suffered, they are aimed at punishing a wrongdoer for outrageous conduct and deterring the wrongdoer and others from acting in the same way. Words like "contumelious", "high-handed", "oppressive" and "wilful" are used to describe the sort of conduct which attracts an award of exemplary damages.
Awards for exemplary damages in cases of negligence will only be made where the conduct is intentional, or where the defendant has a conscious appreciation of the risk of causing harm and makes a deliberate decision to run that risk. It is a very high threshold, and awards are rare. Exemplary damages are not a surrogate for compensatory damages and must not be allowed to subvert the accident compensation scheme.
Ms Taylor's claim is that the RNZAF is either vicariously or directly liable for the actions of Mr Roper. She also claims that the RNZAF owed her a duty of care as an employer to protect her from Mr Roper. Ms Taylor's claim is not for systemic failures in the way the RNZAF dealt with sexual abuse and misconduct in the 1980s.
To prove her claim, Ms Taylor seeks to adduce evidence in addition to that called at the 2018 trial. The evidence sought to be adduced is of a report commissioned by the Chief of the RNZAF in 2016 following Mr Roper's convictions for sexual offending (the Joychild report). That application is opposed by the RNZAF.
Is the Joychild report admissible? No.
Adducing the Joychild report would add very little to the evidence already heard by the Court. That is because many of those interviewed by Ms Joychild gave evidence at trial. Moreover, the delay in seeking to adduce the report (which was available prior to trial) was not adequately explained. If the report was to be adduced at this late stage, witnesses who gave evidence in 2018 would have to be recalled, risking a re-running of the 2018 trial for very little gain. There were no exceptional circumstances, and it was not in the interests of justice, that the Joychild report be adduced.
Should exemplary damages be awarded? No.
The Court of Appeal has confirmed that exemplary damages are generally unavailable for vicarious liability. The Court of Appeal has also confirmed that s 6 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 means the Crown cannot be sued directly in tort. That may seem unfair, but it is for Parliament to change the law if it sees fit.
The claim that the RNZAF owed a duty of care as an employer (or something similar) is a novel legal claim. Even if such a duty could be established, the evidence falls short of the high threshold for exemplary damages to be awarded in cases of negligence. There is no evidence that the RNZAF consciously appreciated the risks that Mr Roper posed to Ms Taylor and decided to deliberately run those risks. Nor is there any evidence of outrageous, high-handed, malicious, or wilful conduct which would attract an award of exemplary damages for negligence. It was Mr Roper who was the flagrant wrongdoer; not the RNZAF. The fact that processes have been changed in the last 30 years means that an award of exemplary damages would not serve a deterrent purpose either.
The Court has every sympathy for Ms Taylor and what she endured at the hands of Mr Roper in the 1980s. However, an award of exemplary damages against the RNZAF cannot be justified on the law and the evidence called at trial. For these reasons, the claim is dismissed.
Exemplary damages are in a different category to those routinely sought in a civil claim. Rather than compensating for harm suffered, they are aimed at punishing a wrongdoer for outrageous conduct and deterring the wrongdoer and others from acting in the same way. Words like "contumelious", "high-handed", "oppressive" and "wilful" are used to describe the sort of conduct which attracts an award of exemplary damages.
Awards for exemplary damages in cases of negligence will only be made where the conduct is intentional, or where the defendant has a conscious appreciation of the risk of causing harm and makes a deliberate decision to run that risk. It is a very high threshold, and awards are rare. Exemplary damages are not a surrogate for compensatory damages and must not be allowed to subvert the accident compensation scheme.
Ms Taylor's claim is that the RNZAF is either vicariously or directly liable for the actions of Mr Roper. She also claims that the RNZAF owed her a duty of care as an employer to protect her from Mr Roper. Ms Taylor's claim is not for systemic failures in the way the RNZAF dealt with sexual abuse and misconduct in the 1980s.
To prove her claim, Ms Taylor seeks to adduce evidence in addition to that called at the 2018 trial. The evidence sought to be adduced is of a report commissioned by the Chief of the RNZAF in 2016 following Mr Roper's convictions for sexual offending (the Joychild report). That application is opposed by the RNZAF.
Is the Joychild report admissible? No.
Adducing the Joychild report would add very little to the evidence already heard by the Court. That is because many of those interviewed by Ms Joychild gave evidence at trial. Moreover, the delay in seeking to adduce the report (which was available prior to trial) was not adequately explained. If the report was to be adduced at this late stage, witnesses who gave evidence in 2018 would have to be recalled, risking a re-running of the 2018 trial for very little gain. There were no exceptional circumstances, and it was not in the interests of justice, that the Joychild report be adduced.
Should exemplary damages be awarded? No.
The Court of Appeal has confirmed that exemplary damages are generally unavailable for vicarious liability. The Court of Appeal has also confirmed that s 6 of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950 means the Crown cannot be sued directly in tort. That may seem unfair, but it is for Parliament to change the law if it sees fit.
The claim that the RNZAF owed a duty of care as an employer (or something similar) is a novel legal claim. Even if such a duty could be established, the evidence falls short of the high threshold for exemplary damages to be awarded in cases of negligence. There is no evidence that the RNZAF consciously appreciated the risks that Mr Roper posed to Ms Taylor and decided to deliberately run those risks. Nor is there any evidence of outrageous, high-handed, malicious, or wilful conduct which would attract an award of exemplary damages for negligence. It was Mr Roper who was the flagrant wrongdoer; not the RNZAF. The fact that processes have been changed in the last 30 years means that an award of exemplary damages would not serve a deterrent purpose either.
The Court has every sympathy for Ms Taylor and what she endured at the hands of Mr Roper in the 1980s. However, an award of exemplary damages against the RNZAF cannot be justified on the law and the evidence called at trial. For these reasons, the claim is dismissed.
Media Release
- MR [2025] NZHC 30 (PDF, 144 KB)
Case number
[2024] NZHC 3794
Date of Judgment
19 December 2024
Summary
This judgment concerns two appeals by Te Rūnanga o Ngāti Whātua and Royal Forest and Bird Protection Society of New Zealand Inc against the Environment Court interim decision indicating that consent for a large new landfill in the Wayby Valley might be approved on satisfaction that specified effects management measures will adequately address key effects. There is also application by Ngāti Manuhiri to strike out the Te Rūnanga appeal.
Te Rūnanga Appeal:
Te Rūnanga claimed that the Court: was wrong about who held mana whenua in respect of the site; failed to make findings about relative strength in accordance with Ngāti Maru; and should have but failed to treat Ngāti Whātua’s tikanga position as a cultural bottom line given that cl E3.3(5) of the Auckland Unitary Plan (AUP) requires that significant adverse effects on mana whenua values must be avoided. Te Rūnanga also claimed that the Court should have rejected the application because of the inadequacy of the alternative site assessment. Finally, Te Rūnanga claimed that inadequate regard was given to the Waste Minimisation Act and the Waste Minimisation Plan.
Held: Key factual findings about mana whenua rohe were available to the Environment Court, including that Ngāti Manuhiri have a more intimate relationship with the site of the Landfill. It would have been better for the Court to overtly apply the Ngāti Maru three pronged approach to strength of relationship issues for transparency and cogency reasons. Nevertheless the Court was satisfied the Environment Court adequately addressed the relevant matters. Importantly the Environment Court gave close attention to the mana whenua values of Ngāti Whātua, Te Uri o Hau and Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei. In relation to tikanga bottom lines, in the present case there is also a major obstacle to finding that the tikanga of a particular iwi is a cultural bottom line because, among other things, all affected iwi and hapū might legitimately claim that their tikanga position is a bottom line. What was required was a process of reconciliation and balancing, having regard to several factors including the strength of relationship while also recognising, as far as possible, the relational interests and responsibilities of all mana whenua. The Environment Court’s approach to alternative sites and waste minimisation was not obviously flawed. In addition, the appeal was premature because the Court had not made any final findings as to whether the effects of the proposed activity could be managed appropriately, and in respect of key freshwater effects, to a no material harm level.
Forest and Bird Appeal:
A key feature of the Forest and Bird appeal is that the Court failed to apply the directive NPS-FM “avoid” policies as bottom lines by adopting a “pragmatic and proportional”, as well as a “holistic” approach to the assessment of effects and the interpretation of the “avoid” policies. They also claim that the Court’s “no material harm” approach to the “avoid” requirement was flawed. The Court is also said to have erred because it interpreted Policy E13.3 as relating to only discharge effects when it expressly requires that effects of new landfills must be avoided.
Held: the “pragmatic and proportional” approach was not a flawed “overall judgment” or “blender” approach but rather the Court employed an appropriate balancing approach commensurate with the purposes of the NPS-FM policies. However, the Court was wrong to find that only the policies relating to mauri were bottom lines. An exceptions pathway approach (as per East West Link) was appropriate in respect of the NPS-FM “avoid” policies. In identifying the criteria for the exceptions pathway, a structured balancing was mandated, making it necessary to take into account the policies of the AUP that recognise infrastructure and mana whenua values. In any event, because the Environment Court adopted a no material harm approach, this “bottom line error” was not material to the outcome. Further this appeal was also premature for many of the same reasons as the Te Rūnanga appeal. “Material harm” is an appropriate standard for the “avoid” policies in this context. The Supreme Court in Trans-Tasman and Port Otago endorsed no material harm as a valid measure of “avoid”. Whether no material harm arises, including by reason of offset, is a matter for the Court as the expert trier of fact. Whether they are right or wrong about that cannot sensibly be assessed in this Court (if at all) until the final findings are made about the scale of such effects. Policy E13.3 when read in context, does not require that all effects of new landfills must be avoided. The reading advanced by Forest and Bird would cut across the scheme of the AUP.
One further finding of some general interest is that the principle against retrospective effect does not apply to the NPS-FM policies introduced after the application commenced because, in short, WM has no existing rights or interests affected by the new NPS-FM policies.
Strike out:
While the appeals were dismissed, they were not obviously meritless. One obvious problem for both appeals is that they were premature given key findings as to effect had yet to be made. It was not yet clear that consent would be granted. The points of law therefore were to be tested against a hypothetical.
Outcome: The appeals and the strike out are dismissed.
Te Rūnanga Appeal:
Te Rūnanga claimed that the Court: was wrong about who held mana whenua in respect of the site; failed to make findings about relative strength in accordance with Ngāti Maru; and should have but failed to treat Ngāti Whātua’s tikanga position as a cultural bottom line given that cl E3.3(5) of the Auckland Unitary Plan (AUP) requires that significant adverse effects on mana whenua values must be avoided. Te Rūnanga also claimed that the Court should have rejected the application because of the inadequacy of the alternative site assessment. Finally, Te Rūnanga claimed that inadequate regard was given to the Waste Minimisation Act and the Waste Minimisation Plan.
Held: Key factual findings about mana whenua rohe were available to the Environment Court, including that Ngāti Manuhiri have a more intimate relationship with the site of the Landfill. It would have been better for the Court to overtly apply the Ngāti Maru three pronged approach to strength of relationship issues for transparency and cogency reasons. Nevertheless the Court was satisfied the Environment Court adequately addressed the relevant matters. Importantly the Environment Court gave close attention to the mana whenua values of Ngāti Whātua, Te Uri o Hau and Ngāti Whātua Ōrākei. In relation to tikanga bottom lines, in the present case there is also a major obstacle to finding that the tikanga of a particular iwi is a cultural bottom line because, among other things, all affected iwi and hapū might legitimately claim that their tikanga position is a bottom line. What was required was a process of reconciliation and balancing, having regard to several factors including the strength of relationship while also recognising, as far as possible, the relational interests and responsibilities of all mana whenua. The Environment Court’s approach to alternative sites and waste minimisation was not obviously flawed. In addition, the appeal was premature because the Court had not made any final findings as to whether the effects of the proposed activity could be managed appropriately, and in respect of key freshwater effects, to a no material harm level.
Forest and Bird Appeal:
A key feature of the Forest and Bird appeal is that the Court failed to apply the directive NPS-FM “avoid” policies as bottom lines by adopting a “pragmatic and proportional”, as well as a “holistic” approach to the assessment of effects and the interpretation of the “avoid” policies. They also claim that the Court’s “no material harm” approach to the “avoid” requirement was flawed. The Court is also said to have erred because it interpreted Policy E13.3 as relating to only discharge effects when it expressly requires that effects of new landfills must be avoided.
Held: the “pragmatic and proportional” approach was not a flawed “overall judgment” or “blender” approach but rather the Court employed an appropriate balancing approach commensurate with the purposes of the NPS-FM policies. However, the Court was wrong to find that only the policies relating to mauri were bottom lines. An exceptions pathway approach (as per East West Link) was appropriate in respect of the NPS-FM “avoid” policies. In identifying the criteria for the exceptions pathway, a structured balancing was mandated, making it necessary to take into account the policies of the AUP that recognise infrastructure and mana whenua values. In any event, because the Environment Court adopted a no material harm approach, this “bottom line error” was not material to the outcome. Further this appeal was also premature for many of the same reasons as the Te Rūnanga appeal. “Material harm” is an appropriate standard for the “avoid” policies in this context. The Supreme Court in Trans-Tasman and Port Otago endorsed no material harm as a valid measure of “avoid”. Whether no material harm arises, including by reason of offset, is a matter for the Court as the expert trier of fact. Whether they are right or wrong about that cannot sensibly be assessed in this Court (if at all) until the final findings are made about the scale of such effects. Policy E13.3 when read in context, does not require that all effects of new landfills must be avoided. The reading advanced by Forest and Bird would cut across the scheme of the AUP.
One further finding of some general interest is that the principle against retrospective effect does not apply to the NPS-FM policies introduced after the application commenced because, in short, WM has no existing rights or interests affected by the new NPS-FM policies.
Strike out:
While the appeals were dismissed, they were not obviously meritless. One obvious problem for both appeals is that they were premature given key findings as to effect had yet to be made. It was not yet clear that consent would be granted. The points of law therefore were to be tested against a hypothetical.
Outcome: The appeals and the strike out are dismissed.
Case number
[2024] NZHC 3745
Summary
Customary marine title granted under Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 to seven applicants in the Northern Wairarapa coast, from southern bank of the Whareama River to Ouepoto in the north. All CMT orders made from the mean high-water springs (MHWS) out to five kms at sea. Representation and mandate issues addressed. Some CMT orders made on basis of shared exclusivity. Commercial fishing found not to constitute "substantial interruption" of applicants' customary rights.
Judgment issued on an interim basis. Protected customary rights and effect of Combined Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 proceedings [2024] NZSC 164 to be addressed in separate judgment.
Judgment issued on an interim basis. Protected customary rights and effect of Combined Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011 proceedings [2024] NZSC 164 to be addressed in separate judgment.
Case name
Case number
[2024] NZHC 3824
Date of Judgment
13 December 2024
Summary
Partially successful judicial review of decisions by government departments and responsible Ministers under the Fisheries Act 1996, Wildlife Act 1953 (WLA) and Marine Mammals Protection Act 1978 (MMPA) relating to protection and conservation of marine wildlife and marine mammals.
Findings include that the Director-General for Primary Industries had failed to carry out an assessment under s 294 of the Fisheries Act before contracting out certain statutory functions; DOC's policy that the receipt of non-fish or protected species reports from commercial fishers was adequate to meet reporting requirements under ss 63, 63A and 63B of the WLA and ss 9 and 16 of the MMPA was unlawful; Director-General of Conservation's failure to present population management plans (PMPs) to Minister under s 141 of the WLA and s 3H(l) of the MMPA was unlawful; and s 14G(a) of the WLA and s 3F(a) of the MMPA do not preclude PMPs from including a maximum allowable level of fishing-related mortality when the threatened species cannot achieve a non-threatened status with 20 years.
Findings include that the Director-General for Primary Industries had failed to carry out an assessment under s 294 of the Fisheries Act before contracting out certain statutory functions; DOC's policy that the receipt of non-fish or protected species reports from commercial fishers was adequate to meet reporting requirements under ss 63, 63A and 63B of the WLA and ss 9 and 16 of the MMPA was unlawful; Director-General of Conservation's failure to present population management plans (PMPs) to Minister under s 141 of the WLA and s 3H(l) of the MMPA was unlawful; and s 14G(a) of the WLA and s 3F(a) of the MMPA do not preclude PMPs from including a maximum allowable level of fishing-related mortality when the threatened species cannot achieve a non-threatened status with 20 years.
Case name
Case number
[2024] NZHC 3370
Date of Judgment
11 December 2024
Summary
Defendant charged with murder and sentenced to 17 years six months' imprisonment with a minimum period of seven years.
Case name
Case number
[2024] NZHC 3691
Date of Judgment
05 December 2024
Summary
Sentencing notes. Manslaughter. Three years, three months imprisonment.
Case name
Case number
[2024] NZHC 3689
Date of Judgment
05 December 2024
Summary
Summary: Wire Reddington found guilty of murder following a jury trial. Sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum period of imprisonment of 14 years.
Held: Section 104(1 )(e) and (g) of the Sentencing Act 2002 made out. The murder was committed with a high level of brutality and callousness, and the victim, Jamie Gill was particularly vulnerable.
Held: It would be manifestly unjust to sentence Wire Reddington to a minimum period of imprisonment of 17 years on account of his traumatic upbringing and contributing mental state.
Held: A MPI of 14 years appropriately addressed the principles of sentencing for murder (s 103(2)), was comparable with other sentences, and properly reflected the offence and offender.
Held: Section 104(1 )(e) and (g) of the Sentencing Act 2002 made out. The murder was committed with a high level of brutality and callousness, and the victim, Jamie Gill was particularly vulnerable.
Held: It would be manifestly unjust to sentence Wire Reddington to a minimum period of imprisonment of 17 years on account of his traumatic upbringing and contributing mental state.
Held: A MPI of 14 years appropriately addressed the principles of sentencing for murder (s 103(2)), was comparable with other sentences, and properly reflected the offence and offender.